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INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL SCOPE

The fall of the Soviet Union allowed Ukraine to become independent for the first time since its short lived independence during
World War 1.1 Within a few years of declaring its independence,
Ukraine adopted a new Constitution on June 28, 1996.2 Ukraine's new

Constitution has provisions which purport to protect the rights of a
Ukrainian citizen. These right-granting provisions, however, are almost uniformly subject to the adoption of future laws in the interest of
the rights and freedoms of others, and also the authority of the state to
protect public health, order, or welfare. 4 One key example is the individual right to freedom of association in political parties and organizations. 5 This right is limited by restrictions established by Ukrainian
law in the interest of national security, public order, public health, and
the rights and freedoms of others. 6 These rights-limiting provisions
which may be used to limit or remove previously granted rights under
the laws of the Ukraine are often termed "claw back" provisions. 7 In
view of such "claw back" provisions, the main thrust of this Note is to
explore, and possibly predict, the future effectiveness of the citizens'
See OREST SUBTELNY, UKRAINE: A HISTORY 355-79 (1988) (discussing
Ukraine's post-World War I attempt to secure and maintain independence).
2 See UKRAYNSKA KONSTrrUZIYA [Constitution] (1996) (Ukr.), translated in
Verkhovna Rada Internet Site (visited Sept. 30, 1998) <http://www.rada.kiev.ua/
const/conengl.html> [hereinafter UKRAYNSKA KONSTITUZIYA].
3 See id. at ch. II.
4 See id. at ch. II.
5 See id. at ch. II, art. 36.
6 See id. at ch. II, art. 37.
7 See Judge Bohdan A. Futey, Comments on the Constitutionof Ukraine, E. EUR.
CONST. REV., Spring-Summer 1996, at 29, 30.
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rights provisions within the Ukrainian Constitution. In particular, this
Note provides a guide for those who may argue for an expansive reading of the rights provisions and a consequent narrow reading of the
claw back provisions before the Constitutional Court of Ukraine.
To arrive at an authoritative interpretation of the claw back provisions, one must determine what Ukrainian agency or court will interpret the Constitution and what such body may use to accomplish this
task. Recent legislation in Ukraine gives the Constitutional Court of
Ukraine (Constitutional Court) sole jurisdiction to interpret the
Ukrainian Constitution (Constitution) and decide whether or not a law
in is, indeed, constitutional.8 The Constitutional Court may interpret
the Constitution using a number of factors. However, because the
Constitution is internally inconsistent, the Constitutional Court cannot
use the plain language of the Constitution. 9 Instead, the Constitutional
Court may use Ukraine's history to divine what was intended when
the Constitution was written as well as what was intended to be
avoided. 10 Another possibility for interpreting the Constitution is using the political consensus which led to the Constitution's passage."
Additionally, conditions may also effect constitutional interpretation
in a social or public opinion context so as to facilitate the public good
economically or socially. 12 The Constitutional Court may use all of
these factors as the U.S. Supreme Court does when interpreting the
American Constitution or may use some or none of13 these factors,
choosing instead the plain meaning of the Constitution.
8

See Judge Bohdan A. Futey, Comments on the Law on the ConstitutionalCourt

of Ukraine, HARRIMAN REV., Spring 1997, at 15, 17.
9 Using the plain language is, in itself, an interpretive decision and is virtually
impossible due to the Constitution's contradictory language. If the plain language,
with no other factors, is used by the Constitutional Court, it would be intellectually
dishonest and a betrayal of the true import of the Constitution. See generally Futey,
supra note 7, at 29.
10 See generally Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) (using
American History to interpret the American Constitution).
1 See id. (using the political consensus which led up to the adoption of the American Constitution to interpret the American Constitution).
12 Compare Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (holding that one does
have a fundamental right to liberty of contract under the U.S. Constitution) with
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (holding that one does not
have a fundamental right to liberty of contract under the U.S. Constitution).
13 See Martin, 14 U.S. at 324-26. See generally Lochner, 198 U.S. 45 (discussing
the fundamental right to contract); see also generally West Coast Hotel Co., 300
U.S. 379 (balancing the interests between employer and employee).
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In sum, this Note is meant to serve as a guide for those who wish
to assure that the rights granted in the Ukrainian Constitution are not
degraded. I hope to provide a basic framework that supports an expansive interpretation of the Constitution's citizens rights provisions before the Constitutional Court. In Part I, I will discuss the historical
basis of both the citizens' rights provisions and the claw back provisions. Part I will also show why the citizens' rights provisions were
included in the Constitution and what they were intended to prevent:
in short, why history mandates a broad interpretation of citizens'
rights while the claw back provisions allow only the most narrow encroachments on the rights granted. Part II will discuss the political
history of the inclusion of the citizens' rights provisions and claw
back provisions. The intent of those who drafted the Constitution and
the political compromises they made to gain passage of the Constitution will also be discussed. Part III will describe the function of the
Constitutional Court, its legislatively mandated procedures, and the
appeals process. It will also describe the various interpretive frameworks which other national and supra-national courts have developed
to interpret similar provisions. In concluding, Part IV will first discuss
the economic threats to Ukrainian sovereignty and democratization in
Ukraine. Political threats to an unbiased interpretation of the Constitution, both external and internal, will also be evaluated. I will conclude
by advocating the interpretive method which the Constitutional Court
should embrace and discussing whether Ukraine will proceed on the
road to democracy or backtrack down the path to authoritarianism.
I. THE HISTORICAL BASIS OF THE CITIZENS' RIGHTS PROVISIONS AND THE
CLAW BACK PROVISIONS 14

A court which interprets constitutional provisions may use the nation's history and how this led up to the adoption of certain constitutional provisions to determine what those constitutional provisions
were intended to allow or limit when adopted. 15 Commentators of
Ukraine law and history have advocated that the Constitutional Court
should use Ukraine's history to aid in its interpretation of the Constitution due to the effect of history on the citizens' Constitutional rights

14 See generally, Jurij Borys, PoliticalParties in the Ukraine, in THE UKRAINE,
1917-1921: A STUDY IN REVOLUTION 128 (Taras Hunczak ed., 1977).
15

See, e.g., Martin, 14 U.S. at 324-26; Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290

U.S. 398, 442-43 (1934).
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future
provisions and the apparent intent of the Constitution to prevent
16
governmental excesses such as occurred under Soviet Rule.
In the 201h century, Ukraine's history reveals an intent to follow
"Western" values and ideology.17 Prior to the 1990s, Ukraine was independent only during one other period this century, namely in the
closing days of World War J.18 The path that the Ukraine chose at that
16 See generally Futey, supra note 7, at 29; ALEXANDER J. MOTYL, DILEMMAS OF
INDEPENDENCE: UKRAINE AFTER TOTALITARIANISM (1993) (examining Ukraine's

troublesome Soviet past and suggesting ways in which it can be overcome); SUBTELNY, supranote 1.

17 See Roman Szporluk, Ukraine:From an ImperialPeripheryto a Sovereign State,
126 DAEDALUS 85, 85-86 (1997) (arguing that Ukrainians identify themselves as
rejecting Polish and Russian national identities); IVAN L. RUDNYTSKY, Ukraine Between East and West, in ESSAYS IN MODERN UKRAINIAN HISTORY 1, 8 (Peter L.
Rudnytsky ed., 1987); Ivan L. Rudnytsky, The Fourth Universal and Its Ideological
Antecedents, in THE UKRAINE, 1917-1921: A STUDY IN REVOLUTION 186, 187, 197,

205 (Taras Hunczak ed., 1977) (discussing Ukraine's 1918 declaration of independence). See generally The First Universal of the Ukrainian Central Rada (1917)
(Ukr.), reprintedin THE UKRAINE, 1917-1921: A STUDY INREVOLUTION 382 (Taras
Hunczak ed., 1977) (asserting that the Ukrainian Assembly has the right to promulgate laws leading to order); The Second Universal of the Ukrainian CentralRada
(1917) (Ukr.), reprintedin THE UKRAINE, 1917-1921: A STUDY INREVOLUTION 385,
385-86 (Taras Hunczak ed., 1977).
Western ideals and values referred to throughout this document refer to the general principles of human rights, limited government, and a civil society which embraces rule of law which are generally acknowledged in Western Europe and North
America. See Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak, The Directory of the UkrainianNational Republic, in THE UKRAINE, 1917-1921: A STUDY INREVOLUTION 82, 94-95
(Taras Hunczak ed., 1977).
18 See SuBTELNY, supra note 1, at 355-79; John S. Reshetar, The Communist Party

of the Ukraine and Its Role in the Ukrainian Revolution, in THE UKRAINE, 19171921: A STUDY INREVOLUTION 159, 159, 162, 180 (Taras Hunczak ed., 1977) (stating that the Ukrainian Communist Party originally had little ethnic Ukrainian content and that Ukraine was oppressed by Russia which had little interest in Ukrainian
independence); Jaroslaw Pelenski, The Origins of the Official Muscovite Claims to
the "Kievan Inheritance," 1 HARV. UKRAINIAN STUD. 29 (1977) (stating that Russia
claims that Ukraine is part of Russia). See generally Alexander J. Motyl, The Foreign Relations of the UkrainianSSR, HARv. UKRAINIAN STUD., March 1982, at 62,
63 (1982) (arguing that Ukraine was not truly independent during Soviet rule); IVAN
L. RUDNYTSKY, The Role of Ukraine in Modern History, in ESSAYS IN MODERN
UKRAINIAN HISTORY 11 (Peter L. Rudnytsky ed., 1987); IvAN L. RDNYTSKY, Ob-

servations on the Problem of "Historical"and "Non-historical"Nations, inESSAYS
IN MODERN UKRAINIAN HISTORY 37 (Peter L. Rudnytsky ed., 1987) (discussing the

relationship among political independence, the existence of a politically conscious
representative upper class, and the completeness or incompleteness of nations).
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point in history was clearly pro-Western and opposite to the antiWestern path that Russia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

(USSR) chose. 19 Although the evolution of a rule of law and democracy in Ukraine were halted by the defeat of the Ukrainian National

Republic after World War I, this evolution was reborn in the Soviet
thaw of 1960-1980.20
Ukraine's history also reveals a long standing tradition of protection of human rights and limitations on government power. 21 As early
as 1710, the Ukrainian Constitution of Pylyp Orlyk (Orlyk Constitu19

See Ihor Kamenetsky, Hrushevskyi and the Central Rada, in THE UKRAINE,

1917-1921: A STUDY IN REVOLUTION 33, 57 (Taras Hunczak ed., 1977) (arguing that
in 1917 the Rada adhered to democratic principles); Taras Hunzak, The Ukraine
Under Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky, in THE UKRAINE, 1917-1921: A STUDY IN REVOLUTION 61, 69 (Taras Hunczak ed., 1977) (stating that Hetman Skoropadsky proclaimed freedom of speech and assembly in 1918); Yaroslav Bilinsky, The Communist Take-Over of the Ukraine, in THE UKRAINE, 1917-1921: A STUDY IN REVOLUTION 104, 111 (Taras Hunczak ed., 1977) (stating that the Communist forces promised democracy); Wolodymyr Stojko, UkrainianAspirations and the Russian Provisional Government, in THE UKRAINE, 1917-1921: A STUDY IN REVOLUTION 4, 6 (Taras Hunczak ed. 1977); IVAN L. RUDNYTSKY, Trends in Ukrainian Political
Thought, in ESSAYS IN MODERN UKRAINIAN HISTORY 91 (Peter L. Rudnytsky ed.,
1987) [hereinafter RUDNYTSKY, Trends]; IVAN L. RUDNYTSKY, The Political
Thought of Soviet UkrainianDissidents, in ESSAYS INMODERN UKRAINIAN HISTORY
477, 479-82 (Peter L. Rudnytsky ed., 1987) (discussing Ukraine's rejection of "national" communism and integral nationalism). Compare UHODA TA KONSTITUZIYA
PYLYPA ORLYKA [Constitution] art. 6, 7, (1710) (Ukr.) with KONSTITUZIYA
UKRAYNSKOYIE RADYNSKOYIE SOSIALISTICHNOIE RESPUBLIKE (as amended through

Nov. 21, 1949) [Constitution] art. 105 (Ukr.), translated in AMERICAN RUSSIAN INSTITUTE, CONSTITUTION OF THE UKRAINIAN SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC (1950).
20 See W. Yevdokymov, Development of the Idea of a Law Responsive State During
TotalitarianRegime and the Transition of Society to Democracy, PRAVO UKRAINY:
IURYDYCHNYI ZHURNAL, July 1997, at 3, 3.
21 See UHODA TA KONSTITUZIYA PYLYPA ORLYKA art. 6, 7, (1710) (Ukr.); see generally 2 UKRAINE: A CONCISE ENCYCLOPAEDIA 1-119 (Volodymyr Kubijovy6 ed.,
1971) (describing Ukrainian legal history). See generally Arthur E. Adams, The
Great UkrainianJacquerie,in THE UKRAINE, 1917-1921: A STUDY IN REVOLUTION
247, 260, 262 (Taras Hunczak ed., 1977); Frank Sysyn, Nester Makhno and the
Ukrainian Revolution, in THE UKRAINE, 1917-1921: A STUDY IN REVOLUTION 271,
280 (Taras Hunczak ed., 1977); Oleh S. Fedyshyn, The Germans and the Unionfor
the Liberation of the Ukraine, 1914-1917 in THE UKRAINE, 1917-1921: A STUDY IN
REVOLUTION 305, 322 (Taras Hunczak ed., 1977); Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, The
Church and the Ukrainian Revolution: The CentralRada Period,in THE UKRAINE,
1917-1921: A STUDY IN REVOLUTION 220, 239 (Taras Hunczak ed., 1977) (discussing calls made by Ukrainian church groups to the people urging them to resist Soviet
invasion).
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tion) included provisions granting fights to citizens and provisions
which limited the authority of the government. 22 The Hetman,23 for
instance, could not use his position for personal revenge or violate the
Orlyk Constitution when it seemed expedient for him to do so.24
Rather, the Ukrainian government was as bound by the provisions of
the Orlyk Constitution as were the citizens. 25 More recently, Drahomanov's (1884) draft Constitution provided extensive protection for
speech, and the press, and additionally prevented illegal searches allowing limitations on these rights only in time of war. 6 The contrast
is stark between these early principles and the Ukrainian Constitution
under the USSR where, due to political and military reality, the government was not bound by any provisions which granted rights and
liberties to citizens due to political and military reality. 27
The current 1997 Ukrainian Constitution seemingly attempts to
prevent Soviet-style governmental control and abuse of the rights of
citizens enumerated in the Constitution.28 One such abuse in the Soviet system was rule by the Central Committee of the Communist
Party rather than the elected Supreme Soviet. 29 In the Soviet system,
the government was controlled by the Communist Party structure
which mirrored the elected government structure. 30 Article 37 of the
current 1997 Constitution specifically prohibits political party struc-

2 See UHODA TA KONsTrrUZIYA PYLYPA ORLYKA art. 6,7 (1710) (Ukr.).
23 Equivalent of an elected Prime Minister or President. See generally SUBTELNY,

supra note 1, at 110.
24 See UHODA TA KONSTrrUZIYA PYLYPA ORLYKA art. 6, 7 (1710) (Ukr.).

25 See id.
2 See Mykhailo Drahomanov, Draft Constitutionfor the UkrainianSociety in the
Free Union, in TowARDs AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF UKRAINE: AN ANTHOLOGY
OF UKRAINIAN THOUGHT FROM 1710 TO 1995, at 171, 172-73 (Ralph Lindheim &

George S.N. Luckyj eds., 1996) (stating that citizens had the right to resist illegal
government acts).
27 See generally Futey, supra note 7, at 29.

28 See generally id.
29 See SUBTELNY, supra note 1, at 386, 510-12; MOTYL, supra note 18, at 67 (stating that the Ukrainian Communist Party was an instrumentality of the Russian
Communist Party in 1917).
3 See BORIS A. TSEPOV, Protection and Promotion of Human Rights: PowerAllocationAmong Central,Regional, and Local Governments in the Russian Federation,
in GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES IN THE U.S.A. AND THE SOVEREIGN STATES OF THE

FORMER U.S.S.R. 410, 411 (James E. Hickey, Jr. & Alexej Ugrinsky eds., 1996).
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ture from mirroring the structure of the government. 3 1 The apparent
intent of this article is to prohibit any political party from forming its
own government inside the elected government of Ukraine. Thus, its
operation prohibits a Soviet-style government within Ukraine.
In the 1930s, Ukraine was subjected to illegal acts of the government of the USSR, most notably at Vinnytsia and during the engineered terror-famine of 1932-1933.32 Vinnytsia, a city in central
Ukraine, was one of the cites where the NKVD conducted mass exe-

cutions and burials.33 The corpses interred at Vinnytsia were exhumed

by German forces during World War II and autopsies were performed
31 See UKRAYNSKA KONSTITUZIYA ch. II, art. 37 (1996) (Ukr.); Cf. Anatoly
Tkachuk, CabinetMinisters'Analysisof the CurrentSituation in UkraineAfter the
1994 Presidentialand ParliamentaryElections, 1994 PARLIAMENTARY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT 1 (discussing the hybrid nature of the pre-constitutional and postSoviet Ukrainian government).
32 See German Government Report on Vinnytsia 1944, in THE TRAGEDY OF VINNYTSIA MATERIALS ON STALIN'S POLICY OF EXTERMINATION IN UKRAINE DURING

THE GREAT PURGE, 1936-1938 91, 168-210 (Ihor Kamenetsky ed., 1989) (describing
those killed by the NKVD in Vinnytsia); Petro Dolyna, Famine as a Political
Weapon, in THE BLACK DEEDS OF THE KREMLIN: A WHITE BOOK 5, 120 (S. 0. Pidhainy et al. eds., 1955) (describing deaths from the engineered famine in Ukraine
1932-1933 at five to six million). See generally Ivan Dudynets, The Great Faminein
Ukraine in 1932-1933, in THE BLACK DEEDS OF THE KREMLIN: A WHITE BOOK 141,
141 (S. 0. Pidhainy et al. eds., 1955) (describing the famine and how it was conducted); KONSTITUZIYA SoYuzu RADYNSKOYIE SOSIALISTICHNOIE RESPUBLIKE
[Constitution] (1936) (U.S.S.R.), translated in ARYEH L. UNGER, CONSTITUTIONAL
DEVELOPMENT IN THE USSR 77 (1981); Danylo Chaykovsky, Stepan Bandera, His
Life and Struggle, in MURDERED BY Moscow 36 (1962) (discussing Bandera's rise
as a leader of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and Moscow's fifteen-year
mission to assassinate him); Dmytro Shtykalo, The Founder of the Revolutionary
LiberationMovement, in MURDERED BY MOSCOW 29 (1962) (discussing Evhen Konovalets' role in the foundation of the Ukrainian Military Organization and the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and his murder at the hands of a Soviet agent);
Stepan Lenkavsky, Soviet Russian PoliticalMurders Abroad and Attempts to Camouflage Them, in MURDERED BY MoScow 5 (1962). Cf. ANDREW WILSON, UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM IN THE 1990s: A MINORITY FAITH 147-52 (1997) (discussing the
theme of national suffering in Ukrainian nationalism).
33 See generally THE TRAGEDY OF VINNYTSIA MATERIALS ON STALIN'S POLICY
OF
EXTERMINATION IN UKRAINE DURING THE GREAT PURGE, 1936-1938, 210 (Ihor
Kamenetsky ed., 1989).
The NKVD is the descendant, administratively, of the Cheka and the forerunner
of the KGB. See CHRISTOPHER ANDREW & OLEG GORDIEVSKY, KGB: THE INSIDE
STORY, ix (1990). All these agencies are organs of state security of the former
USSR. See id; SUBTELNY, supra note 1, at 365, 374, 420, 461, 479, 488-90.
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by international human fights groups.3 4 Many of the corpses were
found with court documents on theirRersons sentencing them to terms
of years in prison rather than death. This evidences the lack of rule
of law in the USSR as court decisions were ignored by governmental
agencies, most notoriously the NKVD.3 6
The implementation of the terror-famine in Ukraine, 1932-1933
further evidences the absence of a rule of law. 37 The terror-famine was
an engineered famine in which five to nine million persons were
starved to death in an attempt to force collectivization upon Ukrainian
farmers. 3 8 Such acts by the government were prohibited by the citizens' rights provisions in the Constitutions of both the Ukrainian SSR
and the USSR of the time. 39 As with Vinnytsia and other crimes of the
USSR's government, these provisions were simply ignored.40

34 See generally German Government Report on Vinnytsia 1944 in THE TRAGEDY
OF VINNYTSIA MATERIALS ON STALIN'S POLICY OF EXTERMINATION IN UKRAINE
DURING THE GREAT PURGE, 1936-1938, supra note 32, at 168-210.

31 See id. at 168-210 (describing the items found with the NKVD's victims).
36

See Anna M. Kvzmik, Rule of Law and Legal Reform in Ukraine:A Review of

the New ProcuracyLaw, 34 HARV. INT'L L. J. 611, 611 (1993) (discussing Soviet
legal theory and how laws were not followed or enforced due to political expedi-

ency).
37 See Dolyna, supra note 32, at 120 (describing deaths from the engineered famine
in Ukraine 1932-1933 at five to six million). Cf. ROBERT CONQUEST, THE HARVEST
OF SORROW: SOVIET COLLECTIVIZATION AND THE TERROR - FAMINE 301, 303, 306
(1986) (estimating 14.5 million dead in the famine and dekulakization, seven to nine

million in the famine alone). See generally Dudynets, supranote 32, at 141, 141-710
(describing the famine and how it was conducted). See also generally Kazuo Nakai,

Soviet Agricultural Policies in the Ukraine and the 1921-1922 Famine, HARV.
UKRAINIAN STUD., March 1982, at 43, 45 (1982) (arguing that the famine of 19211922 was caused by Soviet collectivization).
38

See Dolyna, supra note 32, at 120 (describing deaths from the engineered famine

in Ukraine 1932-1933 at five to six million).
See KONSTITUZIYA UKRAYNSKOYIE RADYNSKOYIE SOSIALISTICHNOIE RESPUBLIKE art. 105 (as amended through Nov. 21, 1949) (Ukr.), translated in AMERICAN
39

RUSSIAN

INSTITUTE, CONSTITUTION OF THE UKRAINIAN SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC

(1950); KONSTrrUZrYA SoYuzu RADYNSKOYIE SOSIALISTICHNOIE RESPUBLIKE [Constitution] ch. 11 (1924) (U.S.S.R.), translatedin ARYEH L. UNGER, CONSTITUTIONAL
USSR 58, 59-60 (1981); KONSTrruziYA SoYuzu RADYNSKOYIE SOSIALISTICHNOIE RESPUBLIKE ch. X art. 125 (1936) (U.S.S.R.), translated
DEVELOPMENT IN THE

in ARYEH L. UNGER, CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE USSR: A GUIDE TO
THE SOVIET CONSTITUTIONS 77, 156 (1981). But see ARYEH L. UNGER, CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE USSR: A GUIDE TO THE SOVIET CONSTITUTIONS 282,

283 (1981) (stating that the Bill of Rights in the 1977 USSR Constitution was more
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Russia has a historical lack of respect for courts and their judicial
decisions. 4 1 Although a full discussion of such conduct is beyond the
scope of this Note, the incidents which are previously recounted here

clearly support the lack of the rule of law in the USSR.42 Soviet law

operated according to political expediency.43 In contrast, the 1997
Ukrainian Constitution prohibits such acts against the rule of law by
the government in Article 60 and establishes rule of law in Ukraine.'
Article 60, once again, shows the effect of history on Ukraine's current Constitution and the intent of the framers to limit the power of
the sovereign (government of Ukraine).4 5
Political reprisals and mass murder which were common in the
USSR are prohibited by the current Constitution in Articles 27-29.46
The prohibition on such acts of the government evidences an intent to
stop any carry-over of the USSR's historical practices to the contemporary government of Ukraine.4 7
A portion of the political ideology of the USSR, namely social-

ism (rather than international communism), remains ingrained in
limited than most other communist constitutions and that the Stalin Constitution
enumerated even fewer rights). See generally KONSTITUZIYA SOYUZU RADYNSKOYIE
SOSIALISTICHNom RESPUBLIKE [Constitution] ch. VIII (1977) (U.S.S.R.), translated
in ARYEH L. UNGER, CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT INTHE USSR 230, 246 (1981)
(outlining the national-state structure of the U.S.S.R.).
40 See MAURO CAPPELLETTI & WILLIAM COHEN, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 21-22 (1979) (stating that early Soviet Constitutions plainly rejected judicial
review opting for political control of constitutional interpretation; it was not until
1977 that Soviet Constitutions were amended to recognize constitutional supremacy); TSEPOV, supra note 30, at 411 (arguing that the Soviet system ignored the very
notion of human rights and the rights enumerated in the USSR Constitutions and the
Republics' Constitutions were never implemented).
41 See ROBERT B. AHDIEH, RUSSIA'S CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION: LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY 1985-1996, at 149 (1997) (stating

that President Yeltsin disbanded the Russian Constitutional Court for 18 months
after September 21, 1993).
42 See Kvzmik, supra note 36, at 611 (stating that socialist law differs from rule of
law in that it is not to limit government but rather to facilitate political ends).
41 See id. at 611.
44See UKRAYNSKA KONSTITUZIYA ch. II, art. 60 (1996) (Ukr.).
41 Such intent to limit sovereign immunity is also demonstrated by the Constitutional provisions which allow citizens of Ukraine to recover monetary damages from
the government when their rights are violated. See id. art. 56.
46 See id. art. 27-29.
47 See Futey, supra note 7, at 29.
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Ukraine and embodied in the Constitution.48 Social welfare rights in
the Constitution include: (1) the right to work; (2) the right to rest; (3)
the right to be provided for when disabled; (4) the right to housing;
(5) the right to an acceptable standard of living; (6) the right to protection of health and; (7) the right to education. 4 These are termed positive rights as they require the government to do something, rather than
prohibiting its action, which would consequently be termed negative
rights. 50 These rights demonstrate the socialist past of Ukraine under
the USSR and socialism's current public appeal in Ukraine, once
51
again demonstrating the effect of history on Ukraine's Constitution.
Environmental disasters during the Soviet period, such as Chernobyl, 52 also have a current effect on Ukraine's Constitution. Environmental protection is held to be a right in Article 50. 53 Chernobyl
was a watershed event in Ukraine's political development in that
many Ukrainians began questioning Soviet rule after the catastrophe
and whether the central government of the USSR actually cared about
the plight of its citizens-specifically Ukrainians. 54 Environmental protection provisions in the Constitution evidence not only a limiting intent on the government and
55 on other citizens' activities but also a mistrust of the government.
Historically, Ukraine has been a pro-Western nation which has
favored citizens' rights and limitations on governmental powers.56
Ukraine's national identity is partially defined by opposition to Russia
48 See id. Ukraine's population was decimated by mass murders of the intelligentsia and the flight of the elites who were so endangered. See ZINOVIJA SLUZHYNSKA,
HUMAN RACE INUKRAINE 100-02 (1995). Some have argued that the current population of Ukraine has been reduced to, largely, those who need and support such
protection. See id. It is also argued that those who support capitalism and democratization are mostly dead or in foreign lands leaving Ukraine without a democratic
intelligentsia to lead it into the future. See id.
49 See UKRAYNSKA KONSTrrtZiYA ch. II, arts. 43, 45-49, 53 (1996) (Ukr.).
"o See Futey, supra note 7, at 30.
51 See M. Melnyk, Commentary on the New Constitution of Ukraine, SVOBODA,
Aug. 27, 1996, at 2.
52 See, e.g., ROMAN SOLCHANYK, UKRAINE: FROM CHERNOBYL' TO SOVEREIGNTY:

A COLLECTION OF INTERVIEWS xiii (1992).

53
54
5
56

See UKRAYNSKA KONsTrruzryA ch. II, art. 50 (1996) (Ukr.).
See id. art. 43, 45-49, 53; SOLCHANYK, supra note 52.
See SOLCHANYK, supra note 52, at xiii.

See UHODA TA KONSTrrTUZIYA PYLYPA ORLYKA art. 6, 7 (1710) (Ukr.); LAH

GREENFELD, NATIONALISM: FIvE ROADS TO MODERNITY 191-274 (1992).
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and is, as such, pro-Western. 57 In fact, Ukraine became anti-Russian
when Russia broke with its Westernization program during the Czarist
era, previous to which Ukrainians had been among the leading proponents of Russian Westernization. 58 Russian national identity after the
Russian revolution is best summarized by Liah Greenfield:
'They fear not laws; right gives way to force, and justice lies conquered
beneath the aggressive sword.' The Scythians were the negation of
civilization, of all Rome stood for, the embodiment of the forces of
darkness .... Only in utter exasperation [about Russia's lack of national identity] could [the59 Russian intelligentsia of 1917] claim the
name of this savage tribe.

Ukraine, therefore, has a national identity which supports60 Western
thought, civil liberties, and limits on governmental authority.
Ukraine's pro-Western national identity is further indicated by
the similarity between many citizens' rights provisions in its Constitution and the provisions in the U.S. Constitution which limit governmental power and provide rights for citizens. 61 The negative rights
provisions in Ukraine's Constitution which are based on its proWestern national identity, history, and historical animosity toward
Russia6U include: (1) the rights which are enumerated are not an ex57 See GREENFELD, supra note 56, at 191-274; Yevdokymov, supra note 20, at 3, 4
(stating that rule of law and human rights are growing in popularity in Ukraine).
58 See GREENFELD, supra note 56, at 191-274.
59 Id. at 273.
60 See generally Tkachuk, supra note 31 (describing the distribution of power in
post-independence, pre-Constitution Ukraine).
61 Compare UKRAYNSKA KONSTITUZIYA ch. II (1996) (Ukr.) with U.S. CONST.

amend. I-X. The superficial similarity in these provisions begins with the granting
of similar rights and ends at the point where the claw back provisions occur.
62 See JuRu BORYS, THE RUSSIAN COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE SOVIETIZATION OF

UKRAINE 298, 321, 331 (1960). See generally IVAN L. RUDNYTSKY, Soviet Ukraine
in HistoricalPerspective, in ESSAYS IN MODERN UKRAINIAN HISTORY 463, 464-500
(Peter L. Rudnytsky ed., 1987); IVAN L. RUDNYTSKY, The Intellectual Origins of

Modern Ukraine, in ESSAYS INMODERN UKRAINIAN HISTORY 123 (Peter L. Rudnytsky ed., 1987) (discussing the influences on Ukrainian intellectual development
prior to World War I); IVAN L. RUDNYTSKY, The First UkrainianPoliticalProgram:
Mykhailo Drahomanov's "Introduction" to Hromada, in ESSAYS IN MODERN
UKRAINIAN HISTORY 225 (Peter L. Rudnytsky ed., 1987) (critiquing Drahomanov's
theory of an all-Ukrainian democratic communalism); IVAN L. RUDNYTSKY, The

Ukrainian National Movement on the Eve of the First World War, in ESSAYS IN
MODERN UKRAINIAN HISTORY 375, 386-87 (Peter L. Rudnytsky ed., 1987) (discussing the Russification of Ukraine and the countervailing nationalist consciousness of
Ukrainians); George A. Brinkley, Jr., Allied Policy and French Intervention in the
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haustive list of citizens' rights; (2) citizens have the right to equal protection under the law; (3) the inviolability of one's home; (4) the right

to privacy in one's mail and correspondence; (5) the right to freedom
in one's personal life; (6) the right to freedom of movement within

Ukraine and to leave Ukraine; (7) the right to freedom of speech; (8)
the right to freedom of religion; (9) the right to freedom of associa-

tion; (10) the right to vote; (11) the right to assemble peacefully; (12)
the right to engage in entrepreneurship, own property, and protect
one's intellectual property; (13~) the right to strike; (14) the prohibition

on enacting retroactive laws.6 The similarity between provisions in
Ukraine's Constitution and those in the U.S. Constitution as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court demonstrate an intent to regain
Ukraine's Western national identity and historically Western ideology, as well as to set Ukraine apart from Russia in terms of national
identity and history, especially during the Soviet period. 64 Moreover,
the Constitution seeks to create a civil society which was thought to
be "capitalist subterfuge" during the Soviet period. 65 Indeed, civil society did not even exist in the pre-1989 USSR.66

Ukraine, 1917-1920, in THE UKRAINE, 1917-1921: A STUDY IN REVOLUTION 323

(Taras Hunczak ed., 1977) (exploring the complex political and social context encountered by the Allies in their attempt to intervene in Russia during World War I);
Constantine Warvariv, America and the UkrainianNational Cause, 1917-1920, in
THE UKRAINE, 1917-1921: A STUDY IN REVOLUTION 352, 378 (Taras Hunczak ed.,

1977) (referring to the U.S. State Department's view that popular demand for greater
Ukrainian local autonomy existed there in 1919).
63 See UKRAYNSKA KONSTITUZiYA ch. II, arts. 21, 22, 24, 30-36, 38, 39, 41,42,44,
58 (1996) (Ukr.).
54 See Futey, supra note 7, at 29; Ukraine Sets Coursefor the West, CURRENT DiGEST OF THE POST-SOVIET PRESS, May 22, 1996, at 26 (condensing and translating

Vladimir Skachko's original article appearing in SEVODNYA, Apr. 24, 1996, at 8);
Evhen I. Golovakha & Nataliya V. Panina, The Development of a Democratic PoliticalIdentity in Contemporary UkrainianPoliticalCulture, in NATIONALISM, ETHNIcrrY AND IDENTITY 403, 403 (Russell F. Farnen ed., 1994).

6 See Yevdokymov, supra note 20, at 3.
6 See MOTYL, supra note 16, at 60.
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I1. CONTEMPORARY PoLrTCAL AND IDEOLOGICAL BASIS OF THE67

CIrIZENS' RIGHTS PROvISIONS AND THE CLAW BACK PROVISIONS

The framers' intent is appropriately used by courts to interpret a
constitution. 68 Ukraine, prior to the 1997 Constitution's adoption, experienced a proliferation of parties, perhaps in response to the end of
Soviet one-party rule, including the Socialist party, the Peasant's
party, the69 Green party, the Nationalist parties, and the Christian Democrats.
The number of parties in post-independence Ukraine includes
over thirty-eight registered parties in 1996.70 Although the Worker's
Party and the National Democratic movements were key factors in
Ukraine's transformation up until independence, 71 four main groups of
parties are most influential today.72 These groups are the Communists
(which is the largest) and the Socialists (including the Peasant Party
and the Agrarian Parliamentary Faction), who compose the leftist parties, the Ukrainian National Assembly and Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, who can be described as rightists, and the center-right Na-

67 The author considers it important, when considering Ukraine's contemporary
political environment, that Russia has recognized Ukraine, alleviating some of
Ukraine's fear of invasion and external interference. See Roman Szporluk, The National Question, in AFTER THE SOVIET UNION: FROM EMPIRE TO NATIONS 84, 95
(Timothy J. Colton & Robert Legvold eds., 1992) (stating that President Yeltsin
recognized Ukrainian independence as early as November 1990).
68 See, e.g., Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 328-29 (1816) (stating what the framers of the U.S. Constitution intended and basing the U.S. Supreme
Court's interpretation of the applicable U.S. Constitutional provisions on the
framer's intent).
69 See Anatolii Rusnachenko, The Workers' and National-DemocraticMovements
in Contemporary Ukraine, J. UKRAINIAN STUD., Summer-Winter 1993, at 123, 123.
See Golovakha & Panina, supra note 64, at 411. See generally O.L. Barabash, Legislative Process in Ukraine 1994, 1994 PARLIAMENTARY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT 2-

3 (describing the Rada's legislative initiative in pre-Constitution Ukraine); Aleksandr Koretsky & Viktor Zamyatin, There is Now One Fewer 'Land of Soviets,'
KOMMERSANT-DAILY, June 9, 1996, at 1, condensed in CURRENT DIGEST OF THE
POST-SOVIET PRESS, July 5, 1995, at 24 (describing the post-independence, preConstitution government of Ukraine).
70 See Taras Kuzio, The Emergence of Ukraine: Part One, 268 CONTEMP. REV. 119,
123 (1996); Country Report: Ukraine, ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT COUNTRY

REP., 1st Quarter 1997, at 13 [hereinafter Ukraine, 1st Quarter].
7' See generally Rusnachenko, supra note 69.
72 See Kuzio, supra note 70, at 123-25.
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tional Democrats. 73 The Rukh party - which was powerful during
Ukraine's independence movement - has a diminished role today. 74
Although political parties have proliferated, apathy and mistrust
of parties and the government is common among Urainians.75 Rukh' s
platform of bringing Uraine into line with the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights 76 is popular with Ukrainians - who continue
to favor Western political ideas 77 . The main impediments to the citizenry forcing democratization and libertarian reforms upon the government were, and continue to be, the lack of confidence in both the
president and parliament 78 coupled with the fragmentation of political
parties.7 9

Ukrainians embraced independence by a vote of over ninety percent80 and yet many never read the published drafts of the 1997 Constitution.8 1 This created a political disagreement between Moroz
Oleksandr, the leader of the Socialist Party, and President Leonid Kuchma over how the Constitution should be ratified. 82 President Kuchma favored popular ratification while Moroz favored parliamentary
ratification, arguing that the people would ratify anything. 83 The dispute came to a head when President Kuchma signed a decree fixing
September 25, 1997 as the date for a national referendum on the Con-

73 See id.
74 See Program of the PopularMovement for the Restructuringof Ukraine, in TOWARDS AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF UKRAINE: AN ANTHOLOGY OF UKRAINIAN
THOUGHT FROM 1710 TO 1995, at 341, 341 (Ralph Lindheim & George S.N. Luckyj

eds., 1996).
75 See Golovakha & Panina, supra note 64, at 403, 405, 409, 414.
76 See Programof the PopularMovement for the Restructuringof Ukraine, supra
note 74, at 346-48.
7 See Golovakha & Panina, supra note 64, at 403, 424.
78 See Viktor Zamyatin, Authorities Will Argue Until the People Intervene, KOMMERSANT-DAILY, May 18, 1996, at 4, condensed in CURRENT DIGEST OF THE POSTSovIET PRESS, June 12, 1996, at 21.
79 See Country Report: Ukraine, ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT COUNTRY REP.,
4th Quarter 1996, at 11-12 [hereinafter Ukraine, 4th Quarter].
so See TARAS Kuzio & ANDREW WILSON, UKRAINE: PERESTROIKA TO INDEPENDENCE 1 (1994).
8' See Zamyatin, supra note 78, at 21.
82

'

See Ukraine, E. EUR. CONST. REv., Winter 1996, at 29, 30.
See id.
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stitution. 84 Despite the decree, the Verkhovna Rada (Rada),85 the
Ukrainian Parliament, adopted the Constitution two days after Kuchma signed the decree calling for a national referendum. 86 The Constitution was passed in the Rada with virtually no support from the
Communists. 8 In fact, the Communists unsuccessfully attempted to
block the Constitution's passage entirely.88
The debates which led up to the Constitution's adoption included all parties in some way, but the most important Constitutional
drafts were submitted by the Communist faction of the Rada, the Nationalists, and the Christian Democrats. 89 Although the Communist
and Peasant's party initially withdrew from the Conciliation Committee which was officially drafting the Constitution - the Socialists participated only as observers due to a dispute regarding whether the
Rada should be bicameral - these parties were lured back
to the table
90
by President Kuchma's promise of a unicameral Rada.
The fall of the Soviet Union created an atmosphere which was
conducive to the growth of "new" parties or, more precisely, the
growth of parties other than the Communist party and its descendants91
which all wished to have input in the drafting of the Constitution.
See Vladimir Skachko, UkrainianPresidentCalls Referendum on Constitution,
June 28, 1996, at 1, condensed in CURRENT DIGEST OF THE POST-SOVIET
PRESS, July 24, 1996, at 24.
85 The legislative branch of the Ukrainian government is composed of democratically elected representatives who are chosen on a local district basis. See Barabash,
supra note 69.
86 See id. at 25.
87 See id. at 25 (describing Communist support for the old Soviet Constitution
rather then the proposed Constitution).
88 See Country Report: Ukraine: ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT COUNTRY REP.,
3rd Quarter 1996, at 11 [hereinafter Ukraine, 3rd Quarter].
89 See Visnyk, ComparativeCharacteristicsof Various Drafts of the New Constitu8

SEVODNYA,

tion of Ukraine Preparedby the ConstitutionalCommission and PoliticalParties,
1996 PARLIAMENTARY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT 1 (charting and distinguishing the
characteristics of drafts written by the different political parties and the Constitutional Commissions).
90 See Ukraine,E. EUR. CONST. REV., Spring-Summer 1996, at 27, 28. Presumably
the parties which refused to participate without the promise of a unicameral Rada
felt that such organization would maximize the possibility that they would control
the Rada. See Zamyatin, supra note 78, at 21. They were probably persuaded by the
tradition of a unicameral legislature, or feared a bicameral legislature would lead to
federalization of Ukraine and a loss of independence. See id.
91 See KuzIo & WILSON, supra note 80, at 18-41.
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One of the notable
92 parties which emerged after the fall of the USSR is
the Green party. The Green party has its genesis in the Chernobyl
disaster and the other environmental catastrophes of the Soviet period.93 As the name implies, the Green party's interests are centered
around environmental protection. 94 The Green Party's impact in the
Constitutional drafting process can be seen in the environmental protection clause in the Constitution. 95 The Nationalist parties, although
weakened by some seventy years of international communist rule, still
exist and are popular in western Ukraine. 96 These Nationalist parties
97
are not national socialists but rather democratic in their ideology.
Christian Democrats have also created a party.98 Indeed, Christianity,
although never truly exterminated in Ukraine, has experienced a popular re-birth since religious freedom was established. 99One of the largest problems encountered during the drafting of
the Constitution was a lack of consensus. 100 When one compares the
three most important draft proposals of the Constitution (Nationalist,
Communist faction of the Rada, and Christian Democrat proposals)
with the current 1997 Constitution, it appears that the Constitution is
one of compromise. 1 1 Such deduction may lead to the conclusion that
items not chosen were intended to be excluded from the Constitution.
When one compares the various drafts of the Constitution proposed by the Ukrainian political parties and the language adopted,
clear choices by the Rada are evident.102 Overall, the draft proposed
by the Communist faction of the Rada (which is similar - in major
92 See SOLCHANYK, supra note 52; Roman Szporluk, National Reawakening:
Ukraine and Belorussia, in THE SOviET EMPIRE: THE CHALLENGE OF NATIONAL AND
DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENTS 75, 78, 90 (Uri Ra'Anan ed., 1990) (stating that Cherno-

byl stimulated Ukrainian nationalist movements).
93 See SOLCHANYK, supra note 52, at xix-xx.
94 See id.
95 See UKRAYN KA KONsTrruziyA ch. II, art. 50 (1996) (Ukr.).
96 See WILSON, supra note 32, at 152 (noting that Ukrainian liberation struggles
have served to mobilize nationalists in western Ukraine).
97 See id. at 148. See generally Rusnachenko, supra note 69 (discussing the relationship between the Workers' and National Democratic Movements in Ukraine).
98 See Visnyk, supra note 89.
99 See SUBTELNY, supra note 1, at 193-94, 400-02, 519-20, 541.
10DSee

Judge Bohdan A. Futey, Ukraine'sDraft ConstitutionMeets PoliticalReal-

ity, E. EuR. CONST. REv. 14 (Winter 1993).
101See Visnyk, supra note 89.
'02

See id.
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parts identical - to the USSR Constitution) has been rejected. 0 3 The
drafts proposed by the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists and the
Christian Democratic Party (which are substantially similar) were
adopted virtually verbatim.1°4 As the drafts of the parties which favor
personal liberty and democratic ideals were the basis of the Constitution, it is clear that their intent, even if not stated eloquently, should
be the basis of Constitutional interpretation. In short, the framers' intent was democratic and favored individual freedom.

m-I.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT'S ROLE
IN INTERPRETING THE
CONSTITUTION 1 °5
Ukraine's Constitution purports to protect virtually all the rights
which the U.S. Constitution does by direct statement or judicial interpretation.10 6 Guaranteed rights include the negative provisions which
prohibit the government from acting, such as freedom of speech, religion, assembly, personal affairs, movement, freedom to strike, own
property, protect one's intellectual property, conduct entrepreneurial
activity, vote, and the right to privacy in one's correspondence and
dwelling place. 10 7 The Constitution also prohibits the government
from subjecting a citizen to double jeopardy, retroactive laws, and
providing unequal protection under the law. 10 Moreover the Constitution states that the enumeration of rights is not exhaustive and may
not be degraded. 109
A. ProceduralIssues Involved with Bringing a Case Before the Constitutional Court

The Constitutional Court of Ukraine is the sole interpreter of the
Ukrainian Constitution" 0 and its decisions are binding upon the par103

See id.

104

See id.

105 See

generally, e.g., 'Visnyk Konstytutsiynoho Sudu Ukrainy' Bimonthly Sees the

Light, AMERICA, Nov. 1, 1997, at 11 (stating that Visnyk Konstytutsiynoho Sudu
Ukrainy is the bulletin of the Constitutional Court).
106 Compare UKRAYNSKA KONSTITUZIYA ch. 11 (1996) (Ukr.) with U.S. CONST.
amend. I-X.
107See

UKRAYNSKA KONSTrrUZIYA ch. II, arts. 21, 22, 24, 30-36, 38, 39, 41, 42, 44,

51, 52, 54, 58, 61-63 (1996) (Ukr.).
108See id. at arts. 24, 58, 61.

" See id art. 22.
"0 There is some dispute as to whether all courts or just the Constitutional Court
may interpret the Constitution. See Analysis of the Draft Law on the Judicaturefor
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ties and throughout Ukraine prospectively.'
The Constitutional
Court may declare statutory acts as well as presidential edicts unconstitutional and thereby nullify their operation.112 Ukraine has created a

concentrated system of judicial review in which only one court is able
to interpret the Constitution. 113 The enabling legislation for the Constitutional Court came into effect on October 16, 1996 and it began
accepting cases on January 1, 1997."1

The Law of Ukraine on the Constitutional Court of Ukraine (Law
on the Constitutional Court) does not permit private citizens to file
appeals before the Constitutional Court. 1 5 A private citizen may,
Ukraine, A.B.A. CENT. AND E. EUR. L. INITIATIVE, June 20, 1997, 3, 8. Ivan Tymchenko, Chairman of the Constitutional Court (equivalent to U.S. Chief Justice),
stated that the Constitutional Court will interpret the Constitution alone and the Supreme Court of Ukraine will have to stay proceedings during the process. See Roman Woronowycz, Ukraine's Court System: The ConstitutionalCourt,UKRAINIAN
WKLY., Mar. 2, 1997, at 3.
"1 See Futey, supra note 8, at 15, 16, 17. The Constitutional Court's jurisdiction is
limited to interpreting the Constitution. See id. at 16. Courts of general jurisdiction,
of which the highest court is the Supreme Court of Ukraine, have jurisdiction over
all other matters. See id. The Crimean Constitution is part of Ukrainian law and
subject to the Constitution. See Law on CrimeanConstitutionis Approved, CURRENT
DIGEST OF THE POST-SOViET PRESS, Apr. 17, 1996, at 22 (condensing and translating
Vladimir Skachko, SEVODNYA, Mar. 23, 1996, at 4).
12 See Yurii S. Shemshuchenko, The "President"and State Authorities in Ukraine,
in GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES IN THE U.S.A. AND THE SOVEREIGN STATES OF THE

FORMER U.S.S.R. 151, 154 (James E. Hickey, Jr. & Alexej Ugrinsky eds., 1996)
(stating that the president may not interfere with the Constitutional Court).
113

See ALLAN R. BREwER-CARIAs, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN COMPARATIVE LAW 185

(1989) (defining a concentrated system of judicial review). Ukraine may, however,
have a mixed system as the Ukrainian Supreme Court is empowered to interpret the
decisions of the Constitutional Court. See generally id. at 265-326; Law of Ukraine
on Statutory Legal Acts of Ukraine art. 133, 138 (1995) (Ukr.), translatedin Law of
Ukraine on Statutory Legal Acts of Ukraine, 1995 PARLIAMENTARY DEVELOPMENT

PROJECT 1 (stating that the Constitutional Court is "to determine the constitutionality of explanatory acts" relating to the status of Ukrainian citizens).
114 See Futey, supranote 8, at 15, n.3; ConstitutionalCourt Established,UKRAINIAN
LEGAL & ECON. BULL., Nov. 1996, at 5. The Law of Ukraine on the Constitutional
Court of Ukraine was drafted and passed by the Rada. See Futey, supra note 8, at
15. The law contains a number of unclear and repetitive provisions as well as arguably inadequate protection of citizens' rights. See Analysis of the Draft Law on
the Judicaturefor Ukraine, supra note 110, at 3.
115 See Futey, supra note 8, at 18. The standing commissions of the Rada can apply
to the Constitutional Court for opinions. See Law of Ukraine on the Standing Commissions of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, art. 14 (1995) (Ukr.), translatedin The
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however, be able to bring a case before the Constitutional Court by
filing or defending an action in a court of general jurisdiction, in
which case the judge would be responsible for filing an appeal with
the Constitutional Court if issues requiring Constitutional interpretation were presented.1 16 For instance, if a criminal case involved an
issue of privacy rights (i.e. police search), the court of general jurisdiction would file an interlocutory appeal with the Constitutional
Court' 7 and the
case would be halted until the constitutional issue
118
was resolved.

A citizen may also directly petition the Constitutional Court under Article 42 of the Law on the Constitutional Court if that person's
rights are violated - or may be violated - by a law which is unconstitutional. 119 This route is by petition, not appeal from a decision. Thus,
in essence, a citizen may file a petition in regard to a law which is
never enforced against that citizen. Due to the concentration of all
constitutional interpretive power in the Constitutional Court, the
Court has been burdened with an enormous case load with over 1,000
petitions filed and a number of appeals filed in the spring of 1997.120
The speed at which the Constitutional Court can decide these
cases is questionable. As a result, the length of time that must be allocated for important decisions is unclear. 21 The courts of general juLaw of Ukraine on the Standing Commissions of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine,
1995 PARLIAMENTARY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT 1.

116See Futey, supra note 8, at 19 (citing The Law of Ukraine on the Constitutional
Court).
117See Woronowycz, supra note 110, at 3.
18

See id. at 3.

'19 See Futey, supra note 8, at 21 (citing The Law of Ukraine on the Constitutional
Court).
120 See id. at 22.
121Appeals

are, basically, discretionary although it is unclear how much latitude the
Constitutional Court has to refuse cases over which it clearly has jurisdiction. See id.
at 21, 22. Discretionary means that the Constitutional Court has the power to refuse
cases not within its jurisdiction (which is limited to violations of the Constitution
and, especially relevant here, laws which violate citizens' rights under the Constitution) and possibly even cases within its jurisdiction. See id. In concluding that the
Constitutional Court has jurisdiction, it must conduct an interpretive act. One example would be a petition for the violation of a citizen's right to freedom of speech,
where the Constitutional Court would have to determine that the law which was in
question was (at least arguably) unconstitutional prior to having jurisdiction. See
generally id. Such predetermination for jurisdiction should be avoided by finding
that the filing of an appeal or petition simply creates jurisdiction. The procedure laid
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risdiction have jurisdiction over "criminal behavior" which is deas an illegal act of the state rather than an unconstitutional
scribed
122

law.

Additionally, the procedure for the appointment of Constitutional
Court judges raises another issue, as terms of appointment are for nine
1

years without possibility of re-appointment, rather than life tenure. 23
The judgeships will, presumably, come up for reappointment' 24 concurrently, leading to the natural question of whether or not judges are
being chosen with an eye toward particular outcomes of pending
cases. Judges on the Constitutional Court may also be tempted to decide cases with an eye toward future political or employment aspirations rather than strictly relying upon the law, which is particularly2 so,
in areas where the law is fuzzy, such as the claw back provisions. 5
B. Interpreting the Constitution:Methods Used by Other Courts and
the AppropriateMethod for Ukraine
The threshold question with which the Constitutional Court must
deal is the problem of interpreting a document which encodes social
goals as positive Constitutional rights. 126 Social and economic rights
reduce the legitimacy of the entire document as they are effectively

unenforceable, yet given preeminence next to rights which are inout by the law on the Constitutional Court seems to reject this possibility in that the
procedure for accepting a case is multileveled and requires the issue to be one requiring Constitutional interpretation. See generally id.
122 See id. at 18 n.ll.
'2 See id. at 17.

124 See Futey, supra note 8, at 17. The Constitutional Court Judges were appointed
at the same time with all their terms limited to nine years, therefore, so long as a
significant number of the Judges do not die or retire while in office the Constitutional Court will be virtually replaced in its entirety in nine years. See generally id.
'" See id. at 17.
12 See generally Futey, supranote 7, at 28-30.

Social goals which are stated in the Constitution as positive rights of citizens
include: (1) the right to work; (2) the right to rest; (3) the right to be provided for
when disabled; (4) the right to housing; (5) the right to an acceptable standard of
living; (6) the right to protection of health; (7) the right to education; and (8) the
right to environmental protection. See UKRAYNSKA KONSTrrUZIYA ch. II, arts. 43,
45-49, 50, 53 (1996) (Ukr.). See generally Josd Maria Morenilla Rodriguez & JeanClaude Soyer, Report on the Legislation of Ukraine, 16 HuM. RTS. L. J. 344, 348
(1995) (stating that three general areas of rights are granted: (1) civil and political;
(2) procedural and criminal; and (3) social and economic).
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tended to limit government action and are, hence, enforceable. 127 Although there is some question as to whether the Constitution is enforceable in some parts - and whether this determination could erode
the effectiveness of other rights provisions - this Note will assume
that the Constitutional
Court will enforce all of the Constitution's
128
provisions.
Constitutional interpretation, especially in the field of citizens'
rights will probably center around provisions which limit citizens'
rights. 129 As previously noted, the provisions which limit a Constitutional right - in the interest of public order, morality, or the rights and
freedoms of others - are termed claw back provisions. 130 One right so
limited is the right to freedom of thought and speech:
Everyone is guaranteed the right to freedom of thought and speech, and
to the free expression of his or her views and beliefs. Everyone has the
right to freely collect, store, use and disseminate information by oral,
written or other means of his or her choice. The exercise of these
rights may be restricted by law in the interests of nationalsecurity, territorialindivisibility or public order, with the purpose of preventing
disturbances or crimes, protecting the health of the population, the
reputation or rights of otherpersons,preventing the publicationof information received confidentially, or supporting the authority and impartialityof justice.131

These limitations are vague' 32 as the broad wording of the claw
backs gives the Rada much discretion to limit rights. 133 They may be

127 See Futey, supra note 7, at 30.
128

See generally Svetlana N. Kravchenko, Federalism and Problems of Environ-

mental Protection in Sovereign Ukraine, in GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES IN THE
U.S.A. AND THE SOVEREIGN STATES OF THE FORMER U.S.S.R.: POWER ALLOCATION
AMONG CENTRAL, REGIONAL, AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 290, 292-95 (James E.

Hickey, Jr. & Alexej Ugrinsky eds., 1996) (stating that it is the domain of the courts
to protect citizens' rights and the environment).
These social goals (or positive rights) would have been more appropriately
placed in the preamble of the Constitution. See Futey, supra note 7, at 30.
See generally Futey, supra note 7, at 30, 31 (examining claw-back provisions
concerning citizens' rights).
'29

130 See id. at 30. Provisions which permit degradation of the granted right are also
termed "derogatory clauses." See Black v. Law Society of Canada, [1986] A.R. 259,

275, appeal dismissed, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 591.
131UKRAYNSKA KONSTITUZIYA ch. II, art. 34 (1996) (Ukr.) (emphasis added).
132See Serhiy Naboka, Freedom of Press and Information Still Under Threat in
Ukraine PartI, UKRAINIAN WKLY., Aug. 31, 1997, at 2 [hereinafter Naboka, PartI]
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used, in their broadest reading, to limit the right which they qualify to
the point of voiding that right.13 4 To avoid nullifying the rights
granted in the Constitution, the Constitutional Court must perform
some variant of a balancing test. 1 35 In such a test, the Constitutional
Court must balance the interests of the state and the people's interests
in order to give full effect to all articles of the Constitution. 136 When137a
test is not specified, the court must determine the appropriate test.
The court should consider the larger objectives of the Constitution in
constructing the test which include: (1) the historic origins of the
and (2) the relationship between the articles in the
rights enshrined;
13 8
document.

The plain language of the Constitution may lead one to a bifurcated analysis of laws limiting rights within the meaning of the claw
back provisions.1 39 First, one must determine if the law was pursuing a
legitimate governmental interest within the meaning of the claw back,
such as national security, public safety, territorial indivisibility, or

(noting that eliminating false accusations against public officials and insults have
been held permissible state ends in regulating speech).
133 See BERNARD H. SiEGAN, DRAFrING A CONsTITUTION FOR A NATION OR REPUBLIC EMERGING INTO FREEDOM 34-36 (2nd ed. 1994) (arguing that the Constitution is
inconsistent with aspirations of freedom and abundance).
134 See Futey, supra note 7, at 30; Black, [1986] A.R. 259 at 275.
135 See Black, [1986] A.R. 259 at 275; Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell,
290
U.S. 398, 444 (1934); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 328-29
(1816); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (balancing property rights
with the concept of liberty). See generally West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300
U.S. 379 (1937) (balancing the interests between employer and employee).
136See Germany v. Barthold, 90 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 21-25 (1985); Austria v.
Lingens, 103 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 34 (1986); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n 290
U.S. at 442, 444; Martin, 14 U.S. at 328-29. See generally Lochner, 198 U.S. 45;
West CoastHotel Co., 300 U.S. 379 (balancing the interests between employer and
employee).
137 See Black v. Law Society of Canada, [1986] A.R. 259, 276, appeal dismissed,
[1989] 1 S.C.R. 591.
138See id. at 269 (quoting Regina v. Big M Drug Mart, [1985] 3 W.W.R. 481,524).
139 See UKRAYNSKA KONSTrrUZIYA ch. H, arts. 34, 35, 36 (1996) (Ukr.). Such analysis may be impractical as some articles of the current Ukrainian Constitution include
the purpose/interest distinction (e.g. article 34) while others simply state that the
right may be restricted in the interests of certain principles (e.g. articles 35, 36). See
id.
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health and morality of the population. 140 Second, the law's purpose
must be analyzed to determine if it comports with the purposes allowed in the claw back; such as public safety, morality, and the rights
and freedoms of others. 14 1 Hence, though a bifurcated analysis is possible under the plain language of the Constitution, such analysis is

clearly inadequate to protect individual rights. Such analysis provides
no real limits to governmental power, for one can imagine no law of
the Soviet regime which would not pass this cursory scrutiny, all Soviet laws were to pursue national security and public safety in the interest of public safety and morality.142 Hence, a balancing test is more
appropriate.
In conducting this balancing test, the Constitutional Court should
weigh the rights of citizens more heavily than the interests of the
state. 143 Soviet history reveals a long-standing pattern of disregard for
human rights and rule of law. 144 The Constitution attempts to reverse
that trend. 145 Such constitutional intent to limit governmental power is
evident from the constitutional provisions which provide for monetary
16
damages against the government when one's rights are violated.
Soviet-style government and abuse of human rights are also shown to
be against the intent of the Constitution through constitutional prohibitions on parties controlling the government and the enumeration of
140

See id. (describing permissible governmental interests in restricting freedom of

speech, freedom of religion and philosophy, and freedom of association as including
some or all of national security, territorial indivisibility, public order, morality of the
population, protecting the rights and freedoms of other citizens, or health of the
population).
141 See id. (stating that such purposes include preventing disturbances or crimes,
protecting the health of the population, protecting the reputation or rights of other
persons, protecting confidential information, or protecting impartial justice).
142 See generally New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (expanding permissible
police searches of an automobile under a reasonableness standard); California v.
Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37 (1988) (holding that a U.S. citizen has no privacy interest in garbage placed at the curb for collection).
143 See Black v. Law Society of Canada, [1986] A.R. 259, 288, 298, appeal dismissed, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 591 (quoting Regina v. Big M Drug Mart, [1985] 3 W.W.R.
481,524).
14 See SUBTELNY, supra note 1, at 413-21, 478, 500-03.
145 See Futey, supra note 7, at 29; Law of Ukraine on Statutory Legal Acts of
Ukraine art. 4 (1995) (Ukr.), translatedin Law of Ukraineon StatutoryLegal Acts of
Ukraine, 1995 PARLIAMENTARY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT 1 (stating that the Constitution has the highest legal effect and ordinary laws must conform to it).
146See Futey, supra note 7, at 34.
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human rights as protected citizens' rights. 147 Hence, due to historical
precedent and the drafters' intent to avoid future abuses, the claw
back provisions should be construed narrowly against the government. 48

Politics and the economy mandate a narrow reading of the claw
back provisions against the government. Politically, the draft of the

Constitution with broader claw back provisions proposed by the
Communist faction of the Rada was rejected for the narrower provisions in the Nationalist and Christian Democrat draft proposals.14 The
rejection of Soviet-style government which was proposed by the
Communist faction of the Rada' 50 shows an intent not to follow its
traditions of state control. Furthermore, the adoption of proposals by
parties which do not favor extensive government controls on citizens'
lives shows an intent to grant citizens broad, meaningful rights.
Hence, the claw back provisions should be construed narrowly to 1 ive
full effect to the political intent of the drafters of the Constitution. I
Ukraine's current economic situation does not provide a valid
reason for construing rights provisions in the government's favor.
Ukraine's economy is improving and government intrusion has
proven to be ineffective and actually harmful in the past - as shown
152
by the fall of the USSR and the collapse of the Soviet economy.
Ukraine's transition to a market economy requires not only economic,
147

See id. at 29; A. Lytvynenko, The Law and the Culture: Theory and Practice,

PRAVO UKRAEINY: EHURYDYCHNYAI EZIHURNAL, June 1997, at 92 (arguing that So-

viet law was to accomplish a political agenda, but that present law should safeguard
culture and the values of the community); UKRAYNSKA KONSTITUZIYA ch. II, art. 37
(1996) (Ukr.). See generally Mykola Ryabchuk, Democracy and the So-Called
"Partyof Power" in Ukraine, 3 POL. THOUGHT (1994) at 154 (discussing the role of
the post-communist nomenklaturain Ukraine).
148 See discussion infra Sections I., H. The inclusion of the claw back provision in
the Constitution may have been due to an intent to copy the European Convention
on Human Rights, due to political necessity, or both.
149 See Visnyk, supra note 89.
0 See id.

See discussion infra Sections II, IV.B. See generally Futey, supra note 7, at 3031 (concerning clawback provisions as related to citizens' constitutional rights).
152See generally Futey, supra note 7, at 30; Kuzio & WILSON, supra note 80, at 39;
Ukraine, 1st Quarter supra note 70, at 11; Country Profile: Ukraine, ECONOMIST
's'

INTELLIGENCE UNIT COUNTRY PROFILE, 1996-1997 [hereinafter Ukraine, 19961997]; Country Report: Ukraine, ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT COUNTRY REP.,

2nd Quarter 1997 [hereinafter Ukraine, 2nd Quarter]; Ukraine, 4th Quarter, supra
note 79; Ukraine, 3rd Quarter, supra note 87.
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but also personal, freedom in order to flourish. 153 Ukraine's economy,
therefore, not only supports a broad reading of citizens' rights and a
narrow reading of the claw54back provisions, but depends on such interpretation for its success.1
The question remains as to how the Constitutional Court might
arrive at an interpretation. I propose that when a right is granted but
limited by public order, health, morality, the rights and freedoms of
others, or the action of law (or all of these), the limit should be strictly
construed. The appropriate test is formulated by requiring absolute
governmental necessity to facilitate a clear government interest linked
with clear support by the plain language of the claw back provision of
the government's asserted objective, as well as a narrow tailoring of
the means to the legitimate ends enumerated in the claw back. Public
order must be interpreted narrowly to avoid the excesses of the Soviet
period when it was used to restrict the rights of those who disagreed
with the government. 155 A narrow reading of the public order exception on a given right would force the government to show an imminent danger which is sufficiently dangerous to the state (for example,
armed insurrection, rather than a peaceful demonstration).
When taken together with other claw back terms, which may be
interpreted as a whole, public order may be interpreted to require danger to health, morality, or the rights and freedoms of others. The
rights and freedoms of others must also be construed narrowly so that
no more restrictions are placed on the activities of citizens than the
government. The claw backs must also be interpreted not to apply
when rights are specifically granted to individuals. Health, when construed narrowly, requires an imminent danger of death or grievous
bodily harm to other persons. Such restriction is reasonable when construed narrowly and applied to extreme cases (for example, screaming
"fire" in a crowded theater as a limit on freedom of speech).
Probably the most amorphous concept is morality. Strictly speaking, the criminal nature of all crimes is a moral choice; for example
murder is a moral interpretation and morality determines when it is
illegal (such as in war) or permissible (such as in the case of selfdefense). A strict reading of morality would limit its application to
circumstances requiring a moral choice to make an act criminal, in
essence limiting morality exceptions to those instances which are historically and virtually uniformly acknowledged by current western
153

See Futey, supra note 7, at 30.

'-'
155

See discussion infra Section IV. A,B; Futey, supra note 7, at 30.

See generally Futey, supra note 7, at 29 (stating that the intent of the Constitutional drafters was to avoid Soviet-style rule).
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thought as being immoral. When strictly construed the claw back provisions have the potential for156innocuous action and need not negate
the rights which they qualify.

"Established by law" or "envisaged by law" are other problematic
terms in the Constitutional rights grants. 157 In its broadest reading,
simple laws which do not have the legal force of a constitution and are
not enacted by similar procedures requiring a su er-majority in the
Rada could serve to overrule the Constitution. 15It is illogical for
simple laws to be able to override a Constitution which purports to be
the supreme law of Ukraine. 159 Future laws should, therefore, be construed to violate the Constitution when they go beyond regulatory
functions and begin to erode the right itself. The proper way to change
process, not by the less
Constitutional law is through the amendment
60
stringent process of enacting legislation. 1
Although the proceeding proposal appears to be the most appro161
priate interpretive test for Ukraine's unique position and history,
national and supra-national courts have articulated other tests. One
156Cf. Tatyana Ivzhenko & Roman Stoyanov, Ukraine Could Get a Very Good Constitution, NEzAVIsIMAYA GAZETA, Dec. 7, 1995, at 1, condensed in CURRENT DIGEST
OF THE PosT-SOviET PRESS, Jan. 3, 1996, at 24, 24 (arguing that the claw backs are
insignificant and will not harshly limit the right with which they are associated).
157See UKRAYNsKA KoNsTrruzrYA ch. II, arts. 29, 30, 31, 32, 33 (1996) (Ukr.).
158 See generally Futey, supra note 7, at 30.
159 See Law of Ukraine on Statutory Legal Acts of Ukraine art. 4 (1995) (Ukr.),
translatedin Law of Ukriane on Statutory Legal Acts of Ukraine, 1995 PARLIAMENTARY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT 1.

16 See UKRAYNSKA KONSTrrUZIYA ch. II, art. 57 (1996) (Ukr.) (requiring that notice
be given of new laws by a method "established by law" - without such notice the
law is not in force).
161The Constitution was adopted by the Rada rather than by a popular vote. See
Skachko, supra note 84, at 24 (describing the Rada's marathon - about 25 hours cession which adopted the Constitution). The Rada clearly has greater bargaining
power, sophistication, and the ability to write a clear Constitution (reducing reliance
by citizens who act within what they believe to be their rights) - in short, the Constitution could be interpreted as an adhesion contract. That interpretation would lead
to interpreting the Constitution against the government whenever there is an ambiguity and the citizen's legal theory is reasonable. See, e.g., Vargas v. Ins. Co. of N.
Am., 651 F.2d 838, 839 (2nd Cir. 1981); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,
161 A.2d 69, 76, 94-95 (N.J. 1960); see also, e.g., C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied
Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169, 174 (Iowa 1975) (holding that the inevitable result
of enforcing all provisions of an adhesion contract would be an abdication of judicial responsibility).
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claw back provision interpretive method is a four part test. 162 This
method is used by the European Court of Human Rights to interpret
the claw back provisions in the European Convention on Human
Rights (the Convention). 163 The Convention tracks the wording of the
Ukrainian Constitution with one major difference. 164 The Convention
limits the operation of the claw backs to instances "necessary in a democratic society" while the Ukrainian Constitution omits this language.1 65 One can imply such language in the Ukrainian Constitution
due to166its overall objectives which appear to be a democratic civil society.
This interpretive method first determines if there is an interference with an enumerated right by a public authority. 167 Second, the
basis of the intrusion is ascertained. 168 If there is a basis in domestic
law for the intrusion, the analysis continues - if there is no basis in
domestic law, the intrusion is illegal. 169 The next phase of the test involves the interpretation of the claw back provision - if the purpose of
the interference with the right enumerated is covered by the claw back
(i.e. public order), the process continues. If the purpose of the intrusion is to do away with the enumerated right, it is illegal. 170 The intrusion into the protected right is then subjected to a "pressing social
need" standard (not "useful, reasonable, desirable, or indispensable").17 1 The basis of this standard is that intrusion into rights should
172
not be allowed unless it is "necessary" in a "democratic society.'
162
See Germany v. Barthold, 90 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 21-25 (1985).
163See id.
164 Compare UKRAYNSKA KONSTrrUZIYA ch. II,art. 35 (1996) (Ukr.) with European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, art. 9, 213 U.N.T.S. 212, 230.
'65Compare UKRAYNSKA KONSTrruzIYA ch. II, art. 35 (1996) (Ukr.) with Conven-

tion for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950,
art. 9, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, 230.

'66
See Rodriguez & Soyer, supra note 126, at 349, 358-60 (arguing that claw back
provisions must be minimal and conform with the theory of democratic society).
'67
See Barthold, 90 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 21.
'68See id.
169 See id.

170See id. at 23.
7'Id. at 25.

172Id. at 23. See Black v. Law Society of Canada, [1986] A.R. 259, 288, 298, appeal dismissed, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 591 (quoting Regina v. Big M Drug Mart, [1985] 3
W.W.R. 481, 524).
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Moreover, the intrusion into a constitutionally protected right must be
"proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued" by the government
agency.173 Further, the aim must be given by the governmental agency
and be "relevant and sufficient." 174
Other courts use a tripartite test. 175 The first part is the determination of whether the intrusion into the enumerated right is prescribed
by law. 176 The second part is to determine what the objective of the
intrusion is, whether it is legitimate, and whether there is a relationship between the intrusion into the right and the legitimate objective
as enumerated in the claw back. 177 If the limitation passes the first two
parts of the test, it must be necessary in a democratic society or, more
precisely, the limitation must aid free society more than the right being limited. 178 Moreover, the right and the limitation of the right must
be weighed based on their social utility and importance in a free society. 179 This test also requires that no less
80 intrusive means exist to pursue the legitimate government interest.1
Due to the intent of the Constitution to change the Soviet system
of government which did not respect the rights of citizens as protected
in the Soviet Constitutions, the provisions which guarantee rights to
citizens must be construed in a manner which is most favorable to
those rights guaranteed.18 1 Further, one of these tests must be adopted
due to the plain language of the Constitution. Article 1 states that
Ukraine is a democratic and law-based state. 182 Article 3 recognizes
"[t]he human being, his or her life and health, honor and dignity, inviolability and security . . . as the highest social value" and that

"[h]uman rights and freedoms and their guarantees determine the es-

173 Germany v. Barthold, 90 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 25 (1985).
174Id.
175 See Austria v. Lingens, 103 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 34 (1986); Black, [1986]
A.R. at 259.
176 See Lingens, 103 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 34; Black, [1986] A.R. at 285.
'77 See Lingens, 103 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 34; see generallyBlack, [1986] A.R. at
287 (quoting Superintendent Central Prison v. Ram Manohar Lohia A.I.R. 1960 S.C.
633, 640 that a limitation based on public order requires a nexus with public order
which is not hypothetical or too remote in causal chain).
178 See Lingens, 103 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 34; Black, [1986] A.R. at 285.
171 See Black, [1986] A.R. at 285.
180 See id.

18 See generally Futey, supra note 7, at 29-31.
182 See UKRAYNSKA KONSTrruzryA ch. I, art. 1 (1996) (Ukr.).
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sence and orientation of the activity of the state." 183 Moreover, the
rights granted are "not exhaustive," "shall not be abolished," and
"shall not be diminished." 184 Beyond the interpretive techniques outlined above, the Constitutional Court may go beyond the Constitution
to find natural human rights as the rights enumerated in the Constitution are stated to be not exhaustive. 5 In any event, if Ukraine is to
continue the development of its pro-Western national identity, the
rights of its citizens must be emphasized.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AS TO THE FUTURE INTERPRETATION OF THE CLAW
BACK PROVISIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO UKRAINE'S FUTURE
COURSE OF ACTION

A. The Current Economic Situation in Ukraine and the Effect it may
have on ConstitutionalInterpretation

Outside pressures may effect the interpretation of a constitution paramount in these is the economic situation in the nation. 186 The economic situation in a nation will affect politics and legal enactments as
well as, potentially, Constitutional Court rulings. 187 In Ukraine's Constitutional Court, such pressure may be especially severe on Justices
who are not appointed for life and, hence, may seek to protect their

183

Id. art. 3.

'84Id. art.

22.
'85See id. (stating that the rights enumerated in the Constitution are not exhaustive).
Such natural rights may be found in the body of Western thought and are substantially similar to the rights which are guaranteed in the Constitution if the claw back
provisions are construed narrowly.
186 Compare Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (holding that one does
have a fundamental right to liberty of contract under the U.S. Constitution) with
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (holding that one does not
have a fundamental right to liberty of contract under the U.S. Constitution).
187Compare Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53 (holding that one does have a fundamental
right to liberty of contract under the U.S. Constitution) with West CoastHotel Co.,
300 U.S. 379 (holding that one does not have a fundamental right to liberty of contract under the U.S. Constitution). See Black v. Law Society of Canada, [1986] A.R.
259, 278-79, appealdismissed, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 591 (arguing that the change in U.S.
Constitutional interpretation from Lochner to West CoastHotel was due to a change
in the idea of freedom in the United States because of the economic situation).
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199
1 88

future legal and political careers when interpreting the Constitution.
1 89
Further, the economy is currently Ukraine's greatest problem.
The current economic situation in Ukraine is improving. 190 The
rates of increase of inflation and unemployment are falling and are
predicted to continue decreasing, moving from a decrease in the rate
of increase to an actual decrease in the rates of inflation and unemployment. 19 1 Personal income appears to be improving and is predicted to begin increasing. 192 In general, the Ukrainian economy appears to be improving, although it is still poor when compared with
the industrial and post-industrial economies of Western Europe and
America. 93

ch. XII, art. 148 (1996) (Ukr.).
Victor P. Perebenessyuk, The PotentialforConflict in Ukraine, PERSP. CON-

188 See UKRAYNSKA KoNSTrrUziYA
189See

TEMP. UKR., July-Aug. 1995, at 1, 2.
190See Ukraine, 1st Quarter supra note 70, at 11 (describing Ukraine's economic
situation and related factors). See generally Ukraine, 1996-1997, supra note 152
(describing Ukraine's economy from 1996-97); Ukraine, 2nd Quarter, supra note
152; Ukraine, 4th Quarter, supra note 79; Ukraine, 3rd Quarter, supra note 87, at
14-15 (describing the economic reorganization of cabinet members aimed at stimulating the economy); Guidelinesfor the Plan of Economic and Social Development
and the State Budget of Ukrainefor the Year 1994, 1994 PARLIAMENTARY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT 1-9 (describing the government's plan to regulate the economy and
foster economic growth) [hereinafter Guidelinesfor the Plan of Development].
191See Ukraine, 1st Quarter supra note 70, at 11. See generally Ukraine, 19961997, supra note 152 (describing Ukraine's economy from 1996-97); Ukraine, 2nd
Quarter, supra note 152; Ukraine, 4th Quarter, supra note 79 (describing Ukraine's
economic situation and related factors); Ukraine, 3rd Quarter, supra note 87, at 1415 (describing the economic reorganization of cabinet members aimed at stimulating
the economy).
192 See Ukraine, 1st Quarter supra note 70, at 11. See generally Ukraine, 19961997, supra note 152 (describing Ukraine's economy from 1996-97); Ukraine, 2nd
Quarter, supra note 152; Ukraine, 4th Quarter, supranote 79 (describing Ukraine's
economic situation and related factors); Ukraine, 3rd Quarter, supranote 87, at 1415 (describing the economic reorganization of cabinet members aimed at stimulating
the economy).
193 See Ukraine, 1st Quarter supra note 70, at 11. See generally Ukraine, 19961997, supra note 152 (describing Ukraine's economy from 1996-97); Ukraine, 2nd
Quarter, supra note 152; Ukraine, 4th Quarter, supranote 79 (describing Ukraine's
economic situation and related factors); Ukraine, 3rd Quarter, supranote 87, at 1415 (describing the economic reorganization of cabinet members aimed at stimulating
the economy).
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While Ukraine's economy shows many positive signs, a full recovery may be distant. 194 Ukraine is, however, moving toward a
Western economy as the shadow economy shrinks. 195 Ukraine has the
potential for a strong economy due to its well trained workforce and
excellent natural resources. 196 Moreover, Ukraine is demographically
a Western nation with low rates of mortality and natural increase.197
Although the legal framework for economic development is incomplete, 9 the main continuing problem is the industrial complex
as it is "out-dated,
Ukraine inherited from the USSR at independence
99
energy intensive. .. and heavily polluting."
Perhaps the greatest economic pitfall in Ukraine's future is the
energy crisis it faces.2 00 Ukraine currently must rely on Russia for
much of its fuel. 20 ' Ukraine continues to attempt to reduce its dependence on Russian oil and gasoline.202 There remains the potential for
Russia to use Ukrainian dependence on Russian fuel to coerce political choices in Ukraine.2 03 As a lack of fuel can virtually shut down the

Ukrainian economy, the card which Russia holds is a high one. 204 It
remains to be seen if Ukraine will reduce the potential for such Rus-

194 See

Ukraine, 2nd Quarter, supra note 152, at 9.

195
See Dr. Serhii Teryokhin, The CurrentSituation in Ukraine and Scenariosfor the
Future, PERSP. CONTEMP. UKR., Sept.-Oct. 1995, at 2, 9-10.
196See UKRAINE AND UKRAINIANS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD 98-100 (Ann Lencyk
Pawliczko ed., 1994).
'97See Ralph S. Clem, Demographic Trends in Ukraine in the Late Twentieth Century, in THE UKRAINIAN ECONOMY: ACHIEVEMENTS, PROBLEMS, CHALLENGES 47,
47-49 (I.S. Koropeckyj ed., 1992) (describing Ukraine's low rate of mortality, low
birth rate and population growth rate).
198 See On Privatization in Ukraine, UKRAINIAN LEGAL & ECON. BULL., July 1997,

at 19, 21.
199Ukraine, 1996-1997, supra note 152, at 13.
m See Oles M. Smolansky, Ukraine'sQuestfor Independence: The Fuel Factor,47
EUR.-AsiA STUD. 67, 67-68 (1995).
201See id.; Conrad Fritsch, PracticalExperience in Restructuring Collective Agricultural Enterprisesin Ukraine, UKRAINIAN LEGAL & ECON. BULL., July 1997, at 14
(arguing that privatization of agricultural and other governmental holdings is also a
serious problem).

202See Smolansky, supra note 200, at 74-75, 85.
203See id.
204See id. at 85; Oleh Havrylyshyn, Ukraine'sEconomic Crisisand Western Finan-

cial Assistance, 3 POL. THOUGHT (1994) at 161, 168.
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sian coercion by finding other sources of energy20 5 or
20 6 if Russia will

continue to use this dependence for political coercion.
Economically, the positive rights in the Constitution will be very
expensive in a limited state budget. 20 7 It is the duty of the Chamber of
Accounting to pay for what is mandated in the Constitution. 20 8 Hence,
there is a legal mandate and an easily identifiable government agency
to sue if the social rights are not fully implemented. Further, paying
for the entitlements may be simply impossible, even under court order, as in 1996 alone the government was in arrears by 1.3 billion dollars in payments to its employees.20 9
If the Ukrainian economy experiences serious down turns or collapse, the Constitutional Court will be under considerable political
pressure to allow significant government intrusion in all aspects of the
Politically, an economic crisis would
economy and citizens' lives.
tend to make the Soviet system appear more apetizing in spite of all
its trappings of political and social repression." ' Hence an improving
to reliable constituif not robust economy will be more conducive
212
tional interpretation and political stability.
20 See Havrylyshyn, supra note 204, at 161-68.
206 Russia has threatened to cut off oil to Ukraine in the past. See Smolansky, supra

note 200, at 74-75, 85.
2(" See Decree of the Supreme Council of Ukraine on the Implementation of the
Ukrainian Law "On the State Budget of Ukraine for 1994" (1994) (Ukr.), translated
in Decree of the Supreme Council of Ukraine on the Implementation of the Ukrainian Law "On the State Budget of Ukrainefor 1994, " 1994 PARLIAMENTARY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT 1 (outlining the process for implementing the state budget) [hereinafter On the State Budget of Ukraine for 1994]; Law of Ukraine on the State
Budget of Ukraine for 1994 (1994) (Ukr.), translatedin Law of Ukraine on the State
Budget of Ukrainefor 1994, 1994 PARLIAMENTARY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT 1.
2 See Law of Ukraine on the Chamber of Accounting of the Verkhovna Rada of
Ukraine art. 2, 36 (1996) (Ukr.), translated in Law of Ukraine on the Chamber of
Accounting of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 1996 PARLIAMENTARY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT 1.
2D9See Ukraine, 3rd Quarter, supra note 87, at 18.

See generally RUDNYTsKY, Trends, supra note 19 (discussing the populist, conservative, communist, and nationalist trends which lie latent in Ukrainian political
ideology); MOTYL, supra note 16; SUBTELNY, supra note 1, at 510-37 (discussing
attempts to reform the Soviet regime and Ukraine's uncertain future).
211 See generally MOTYL, supra note 16; SUBTELNY, supra note 1, at 510-37 (discussing economic conditions and political attitudes in Ukraine).
210
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B. PoliticalDangers to the Citizens' Rights Granting Provisions Including ForeignIntervention
Ukraine must overcome a legacy of massive political and economic corruption as well as colonialism and the lack of civil society. 1 Ukraine faces several problems in overcoming these problems
including: (1) the "party of power" namely the nomertdatura; 14 (2)
Russian
interference;s and (3) Ukraine's internal political situa2 16
tion.

Ukraine continues to be dominated by former Communists.

2 17

In

fact, politics in Ukraine are dominated by a 9/36 formula in which out
of a total population of 36 million, 9 million residents of Western
Ukraine support democracy while 27 million Eastern Ukrainians, who
actually decide the nation's course of action, favor a more Sovietstyle government.2 1 8 The Ukrainian Constitution shows this pro-Soviet
bent in that the social guarantees
in the Constitution were copied from
2 19
the Soviet Constitution.

One of the greatest dangers faced by Ukraine is adverse foreign
influence, namely from Russia. 220 Russia considers Ukraine a security
threat as an independent nation.2 2 1 Ukraine is considered virtually a
213

See Oksana Grabowicz, The Legacy of Colonialism and Communism, PERSP.
Mar.-Apr. 1995, at 1, 1, 10.
See Ryabchuk, supra note 147, at 154, 159 (stating that the "party of power" (the

CONTEMP. UKR.,
214

Communist party which controlled Ukraine until recently) and the nomenklatura
(the old party apparatus) must be appeased to insure reforms are successful).
215 See Konstiantyn Morozov, UkrainianIndependence in the InternationalContext,
UKR., Jan.-Feb. 1995 (visited Sept. 18, 1997) <http://www.sabre.
org/huri/publications/perspv2nl .html>.
216 See Ihor Lysyj, Former President Kravchuk Addresses Twin Cities Meetings,
UKRAINIAN WKLY., Sept. 14, 1997, at 3.
217 See generally Barabash, supra note 69 (describing the democratization process in
Ukraine).
218 See Lysyj, supra note 216, at 3.
219 See Melnyk, supra note 51.
PERSP. CONTEMP.

m See Morozov, supra note 215.
See John W.R. Lepingwell, The Russian Military and Security Policy in the

221

"Near Abroad," SURVIvAL, Autumn 1994, at 70, 70-74, 79-80; Francis Fukuyama,
The Ambiguity of "National Interest," in RETHINKING RussIA's NATIONAL INTERESTS 10, 18, 22 (Stephen Sestanovich ed., 1994) (stating that it is within Russia's
national interest to protect Russian minorities in Ukraine and that the G-7 world
would support Russia in doing so); Sergei B. Stankevich, Toward a New "National
Idea," in RETHINKING RUSSIA'S NATIONAL INTERESTS 24 (Stephen Sestanovich ed.,
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222
province of Russia by Russian historians and culture. In short, Rus-

sia views Ukraine as a nation which it can "work on" and as a nation
which is not truly independent. 223 Thus, Russian national identity is
the USSR2 24 and as such, Ukraine is an integral part of Russian national identity. 225 Past Russian influence on Ukraine has been disastrous for Ukrainian national identity and has resulted in personal tragedy for the Ukrainian populace.226 There is no reason to believe that
future Russian domination will be more tolerable or productive.227
Notwithstanding future fears and choices as to how the citizens'
rights provisions in the Constitution will be interpreted due to external
forces and the party of power, current issues have arisen as to constitutional interpretation and enforcement.228 One such issue is the freedom of the press provision in the Constitution. 229 Prior to the adoption
of the Constitution, freedom of the press was in doubt.23 ° One such
instance was in regard to those who spoke in a manner which would
tend to be divisive to the various ethnic groups in Ukraine.231
In August 1992, President Kravchuk issued a decree stating that
those who used freedom of speech to split the population of Ukraine
along ethnic lines would be expelled from Ukraine.2 32 The danger

continues today in that most popular television stations are controlled
by the executive branch of the government as are one-quarter of the
1994) (arguing that Russia's national interest includes protecting ethnic Russians in
the "near abroad").
222 See SOLCHANYK, supra note 52, at 128.
223 See Arkady Moshes, The Crisis in Ukrainian and Russian Policy, Moscow
NEws, Aug. 8-14, 1996, at 5.
2 See Roman Solchanyk, Russia, Ukraine, and the Imperial Legacy, 9 POSTSOVIET AFF. 337, 339, 341-42 (1993).
See id. at 339.
22 See generally SUBTELNY, supranote 1, at 403-24, 453; SLUZHYNSKA, supra note
48, at 100-02 (arguing that those who favor democracy have been systematically
killed, depleting Ukraine's gene pool).
227 See Solchanyk, supra note 52, at 19, 20, 128; Grabowicz, supra note 213, at 8,
10.
See Naboka, PartI, supra note 132; Serhiy Naboka, Freedom of Press and In-

2m

formation Still Under Threat in Ukraine, UKRAINIAN WKLY., Sept. 7, 1997, at 14

[hereinafter Naboka, PartI1].
See Naboka, Part1, supra note 132; Naboka, Part11, supra note 228, at 14.
230 See MOTYL, supra note 16, at 15.
21 See id.
229

232 See id.
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5,500 publications in Ukraine. 233 State control of instruments of mass
media may be unconstitutional due to Article 42 which prohibits the
wrongful use of monopolies. 234 Another constitutional question is
whether the state can tax publications so as to control them, which
may be prohibited by Article 92.235 Further, writers need licenses to
sell their work, which may lead to censorship, 6 and many members
of the press have been murdered after printing articles about government corruption and theft.2 37 It remains to be seen how these issues
will be resolved but, if such state control of the press is allowed, the
Constitutional
guarantee of freedom of speech appears to be in jeop23 8
ardy.
The rule of law is also jeopardized by President Kuchma's apparent dislike of the Constitution. 2 If political leaders and, thereby, the
government itself does not respect or follow the Constitution, earlier
USSR patterns of simply ignoring the law may reoccur. It is of utmost
importance, if the rule of law is to prevail, that the Constitution and
the decisions of the Constitutional Court be followed no matter how
unpopular or harmful to personal political careers.
Political infighting as well as fragmented political parties also
continue to plague Ukraine. 240 The Rada has adhered to Western principles and rejected Communist proposed Constitutional amendments
233 See Naboka, PartI, supranote 132; Naboka, PartII, supra note 228, at 14 (stating that the Ukrainian Center for Economic and Political study believes that the economic advantages government owned media have over private media sources violates the prohibition on the wrongful use of monopolies and taxation in Articles 42
and 92 of the Constitution).
2m See Naboka, PartI, supra note 132; Naboka, Part II, supra note 228, at 2, 14

(stating that the Ukrainian Center for Economic and Political study believes that the
economic advantages government owned media have over private media sources

violates the prohibition on the wrongful use of monopolies and taxation in Articles
42 and 92 of the Constitution).
235 See Naboka, Part 11, supra note 228, at 14; Harvard Symposium Regarding:

"Freedom of Speech," UKRAINIAN WKLY., Aug. 24, 1997, at 8 (stating that a license
is required to sell publications).
236 See HarvardSymposium Regarding: "Freedom of Speech," supra note 235, at

16.
237 See Mykola Svitukha, Unpunished Crimes, SVOBODA, Sept. 23, 1997, at 2.
238 See Naboka, PartI, supra note 132; Naboka, PartII, supra note 228.
239 See S. Holovatey Criticizes the Organsof the Government, SVOBODA, Sept. 25,

1997, at 1 (stating that Holovatey commented that President Kuchma asked him to
sabotage the passage of the Constitution).
m1o
See Melnyk, supra note 51.
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which would have limited the Constitutional Court's power and transfer its interpretive power to the Rada. 241 The Communist Party, however, continues to wage war on these democratic forces by insinuating
that the democratic forces are anti-Constitution because the social
rights in the Constitution are not being enforced (due to a lack of
funds). 242 Political reprisals also continue and may even involve the
fling of criminal charges and the denial of medical care while in
jail.A 3 Further, the Rada began impeachmentproceedings against
President Kuchma for vetoing a bill three times21 which may indicate
cracks opening in the rule of law.
The recent elections to the Rada may determine how the interpretation of the Constitution will unfold. 245 On August 28-29, 1997, the
Rada, in special session, did not pass proposed constitutional amendments which were mainly proposed by the left.246 As the elections to
the Rada, in the spring of 1998, created a Socialist/Communist majority, it is possible that the Constitution will be significantly
amended. 247 This may include giving power back to local
248 Radas which
are mostly leftist, thereby diluting presidential power.
In fact, some predict continuing Socialist/Communist control of
the Rada. 249 If democratic forces retain control (whether or not they
call themselves Communists or Socialists), then the discussion as to
how the Constitution should be interpreted will continue to be criti-

241See Marta Kolomayets, Verkhovna Rada Fails to Pass Election Law, Constitu-

tionalAmendments, UKRAINIAN WKLY., Sept. 7, 1997, at 1.
242 See, e.g., Ukraine, E. EuR. CONST. REV., Winter 1997, at 31, 31-32.
243 See Vladimir Skachko, Trial of a Defender of Deceived Investors, SEVODNYA,
Dec. 8, 1995, at 7, excerpted in CURRENT DIGEST OF POST-SOVIET PRESS, Jan. 3,
1996, at 25 (discussing the ordeal of Leopold Taburgansky).
244 See Roman Woronowycz, ParliamentCommittee Acts on Kuchma Impeachment,
UKRAINIAN WKLY., Sept. 14, 1997, at 2.
245 See Lysyj, supra note 216, at 3.
2 See Kolomayets, supra note 241, at 1.

247 See id; Lysyj, supra note 216; Ukraine'sDangerousDecline, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr.
14, 1998, at Al.
ms See Anatoliy Tkachuk, Noted on the Structureof Government in Ukrainein Light
of the DraftLaw on the Local Radas, 1994 PARLIAMENTARY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
1-3.
249 See Lysyj, supra note 216 (arguing that western Ukraine democrats are outnumbered by central and eastern Ukrainian voters who favor a more leftist government).
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cal. ° If not, Constitutional interpretation may be degraded to the
point of irrelevance.
C. Western Aid: Why it is Needed

The Ukraine's land area is the largest in Europe (aside from Russia which extends into Asia) and its population is the fifth largest, yet
is virtually unknown throughout the world.25 1 It is clearly in the strategic and economic interest of the nations of Europe and America to
aid Ukraine in its democratization process. 2 Economic aid is necessary to help create the political stability needed for democratization.253
After seventy years of Soviet rule, Ukraine is also in dire need of political and legal aid in terms of theory and practice in a democratic
society. 4 Ukraine is also in danger from the former Soviet elites in
Russia who may prefer empire to the self-determination of nations. 5
Lawyers, legal associations, and libraries in democratic societies
could be of much aid in providing information.256 Democratic nations
can also assist Ukraine by providing continuing aid and information to
Ukrainian government agencies.25 Lawyers and those with legal expertise in the areas of interpretation of citizens' rights provisions may
also be of aid in defining legal terminology in Ukraine and, thereby,
make the provisions of the Constitution more effective.258 Ukraine is
0 See Clem, supranote 197 (discussing the political and demographic tragedies in
Ukraine's past).
25 See MOTYL, supra note 16, at 1, 4.
252 See

id.

253 See TEDSTROM, supra note 212, at 5; Roman Szporluk, Nation Building
in
Ukraine: Problems and Prospects, in THE SUCCESSOR STATES TO THE USSR 173,

180 (John W. Blaney ed., 1995).
2-4 See generally Futey, supra note 7, at 30.
255

See Szporluk, supra note 253, at 179.

256 See Bohdan Peter Rekshynskyj, Legal News by the UkrainianLegal Foundation:

The "Ukrainian Center for Human Rights" Program (visited Sept. 18, 1997)

<http://news.std.com/sabre/UFPWWW Etc/LawULF/LN9502.html> (stating that
foreign aid should include texts for higher education, instruction to educate judges,
aiding in publication and dissemination of texts, and aiding Ukraine to comply with
international legal standards).
27 See COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE HELSINKI ACCORDS: Focus ON SERIOUS CHALLENGES FACING UKRAINE

(1994) (discussing the applicability of the CSCE Helsinki Final Act to bolstering
Ukrainian democratization).
258 See generally Bohdan Peter Rekshynskyj, Legal News by the Ukrainian Legal
Foundation: Counteracting Constitutional Chaos (visited Sept. 18, 1997)
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in need of immediate aid in terms of legal education and theory,
hence, Western aid should not be conditioned upon its actions on
other issues such as its budget deficit. 259 The main goal of all foreign
assistance should be to allow Ukraine to maintain its independence
long enough to finish the development of its national identity and fulfill its democratic destiny.
If Ukraine is allowed to develop freely and continues to move
toward a democratic society and a rule of law, the future of the rights
of its citizens seem bright. However, Russian domination or interference will, most likely, destroy the advances Ukraine has made and
drag Ukraine back into the abysmal legal vacuity of Russia's past (and
potentially future) national identity.
D. The Appropriate Interpretive Methodfor Ukraine and its Future
Use
The current Ukrainian Constitution does make great strides toward a democratic society.26 0 It provides for rights of citizens and
states honest limitations which, when strictly construed, mirror the
limitations on citizens rights which the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized and which may prevent the government from simply ignoring
the rights of citizens as occurred in the Soviet period. To some degree
clarity is also a positive point in the Constitution in that limits on citizens' fights are expressed - other factors which are not mentioned
probably cannot be legitimately used to limit rights.
On the other hand, the claw back provisions which qualify the
rights which are guaranteed have the potential to limit the rights they
qualify to the point of ineffectiveness. "261 Furthermore, the inability to
enforce economic and social rights which are guaranteed places into
question the effectiveness of the entire document.262 These economic
and social rights are theoretically and practically unenforceable
against the government.263 Moreover, these rights may be simply too
expensive for the Ukrainian Government to provide in the current

<http://news.std.com/sabre/UFPWWWEtc/Law/ULF/LN9505.html>; Rekshynskyj,
supra note 256 (arguing that standardization of Ukrainian legal terminology is
needed).
2S9 See TEDSTROM, supra note 212, at 5.
26 See Futey, supra note 7, at 34.
26 See id at 30.
2 See id.
2 See id.
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economic climate.2 64 Furthermore, if some constitutional positive
rights are not followed, it is possible that the negative restrictions on
government action may be equally ignored. Further, it is obvious that
the inclusion of positive rights in a manner other than goals in a preamble was unwise due to Ukraine's unique history and current economic difficulties.265
Ukraine faces serious challenges in enforcing the Constitution's
citizens' rights provisions without letting them be swallowed up by
the claw backs. If it is to succeed, Ukraine must stay independent, as
"democracy and empire are incompatible. 266 It must defeat internal
tendencies to return to Soviet-style rule or simply amend the Constitution when it conflicts with an illegitimate governmental goal. 267 It
must rise above its history of assassination of her national leaders by
- Further, it must reconcile
foreign powers and Russification. 68
the
270
ethnic divisions within its society 269 and the ethnic crisis in Crimea.
Finally, Ukraine's news media must break the Soviet mold of control-

264See Guidelinesfor the Plan of Development, supra note 190, at 2-3 (describing

how to estimate the cost of economic aid to citizens); Law of Ukraine on the State
Budget of Ukraine for 1994 (1994) (Ukr.), translated in Law of Ukraine on the
State Budget of Ukrainefor 1994, 1994 PARLIAMENTARY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT 1;
On the State Budget of Ukrainefor 1994, supra note 207 (outlining the process for
implementing the state budget).
20 See Futey, supranote 7, at 30.
266Roman Szporluk, Statehood and Nation Building in Post-Soviet Space, in THE
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF EURASIA, VOLUME 2: NATIONAL IDENTITY AND ETHNICITY IN RUSSIA AND THE NEW STATES OF EURASIA 3, 16 (Roman Szporluk ed., 1994).

267See M. Melnyk, About Two Important Projects Concerning the Law, SVOBODA,
Sept. 26, 1997, at 2.
m See Oleksander Rudenko-Desniak, Ukrainians in Russia, PERSP. CONTEMP.
UKR., Nov.-Dec. 1995, at 1, 5, 6 (excerpting a speech delivered Nov. 16, 1994);
Lepingwell, supra note 221, at 70, 79-8 1.

269See Boris Sergeevich Krylov, Concept of Federalism in Light of the Rights of
Nations to Self-Determination, in GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES IN THE U.S.A. AND THE
SOVEREIGN STATES OF THE FORMER U.S.S.R.: POWER ALLOCATIONS AMONG CEN-

TRAL, REGIONAL, AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 415, 415-16 (James E. Hickey, Jr. &

Alexej Ugrinsky eds., 1996) (describing ethnographic policies in Ukraine and Russia).
270 See Ian Bremmer, The Politics of Ethnicity: Russians in the New Ukraine, 46

EUR.-AsiA STUD. 261, 280-81 (1994) (describing Kiev and Lviv as successfully integrating Russian minorities while Crimea has remained problematic).
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and begin
ling public opinion through symbols and yellow journalism
27 1

to operate as an independent check on the government.
Ukraine must overcome these obstacles in steps, first establishing
a state, then followed by rule of law, civil society, a market economy,
and democracy. 272 Ukraine has made great strides down this path.
Russia is not currently a military threat. 273 Ethnic division has been
combated by a "zero option" of citizenship, which gives citizenship to
all those citizens of the USSR who were permanent residents of

Ukraine on the date of its independence. 274 Hence, Ukraine has chosen
not to define itself as an ethnic state, 275 which has served it well in
combating ethnic infighting.276 Ukraine has also compiled a good record on human rights, expounding: (1) a liberal ethnic policy which
is deferential to ethnic minorities; 27 and (2) a path independent from
Russia and toward the Council of Europe's norms for civil rights and

environmental protection. 279 In fact, in investigating Ukraine's application to join the Council of Europe, the recommendation for admittance280was largely based on Ukraine's favorable human rights re-

cord.

See Natalia Kostenko et al, UkrainianMass Media and Freedom of Information,
4 POL. THOUGHT (1994) at 148, 148, 155.
271

supra note 16, at 68-70; George Sch6pflin, Postcommunism: The
Problems of Democratic Construction,DABDALUS, Summer 1994, at 127, 131 (stat272

See

MOTYL,

ing that rule of law is necessary for political and economic stability).
273 See Brian D. Taylor, The Challenges of UkrainianStatehood,PERSP. CONTEMP.
UKR., Mar.-Apr. 1995, at 5, 5.
274 See ParliamentPassesLaw on Citizenship, AMERICA, Mar. 7, 1997, at 11.
275 See Roman Szporluk, Reflections on UkraineAfter 1994: The Dilemmas of Nationhood,HARRIMAN REV., Mar.-May 1994, at 1, 1.
276 See Ian Bremmer, Russians in Ukraine, PERSP. CONTEMP. UKR., Sept.-Oct. 1995,
at 1, 3, 7 (arguing that Russians have generally chosen to integrate politically and
ethnically and support Ukrainian political thought).
277 See Taras Kuzio, The Emergence of Ukraine: Part Two, 268 CONTEMP. REV.

182, 189 (1996).
278 See Susan Stewart, Ukraine'sPolicy Toward its Ethnic Minorities,RFE/RL REs.
REP., Sept. 10, 1993, at 55, 55-57.
279 See Ukraine Sets Coursefor the West, supra note 64, at 26 (stating that return to
the USSR is impossible as the Confederation of Independent States did not work).
28 See Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Opinion No. 190 on the
Application by Ukrainefor Membership of the Council of Europe, reprintedin 16
HuM. RTS. L. J. 373, 373 (1995).
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To continue down the path Ukraine has chosen, and to fully join
the Western family of nations, the Constitutional Court must choose
one of the interpretive models I have expounded in this Note. A failure to do so will inevitably lead to greater governmental intrusion in
what the Constitution describes as protected rights. 281 Governmental
control is not the answer.

28' See generally Aivars Slucis, Russian Imperialism Lives, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25,

1997, at A11 (discussing after-effects of Russian aggression in Eastern Europe).

